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The Protection Of Interests In The Marital Relation
The protection of interests in the marital relation by use of
actions for alienation of affections, criminal conversation and loss of
consortium as a result of personal injury to a spouse is intimately de-
pendent upon the existence of a right of consortium in the spouse
prosecuting the action. The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined con-
sortium as including the affection, solace, comfort, companionship and
society incidental to the marital relationship as well as the domestic
services of the wife. 1
At common law, the right of consortium was exclusively in the
husband and the courts protected his right from either intentional or
negligent injury. The wife was denied such a right, however, on the
theory that she lost her status as a legal entity upon marriage, and
had no legal right to the companionship or services of her husband.
Even granting that she had such a right, she could not maintain an
action for its loss because she could only bring the action by joining
her husband as a party plaintiff, who, if recovery were permitted,
would himself receive the proceeds of any judgment.2
With the passage of the Married Women's Acts,3 designed to place
the wife on a legal parity with her husband, married women began to
assert a right of action for loss of consortium. Thus the question arose
whether, by virtue of the changed legal status of a married woman,
she now possessed a right of consortium and, if so, whether she could
maintain an action for the loss of this right.
At this point the meaning of consortium becomes uncertain as
a general proposition. The right seems to be divided into a "senti-
mental" side, the right to affections, companionship, exclusive sexual
intercourse and comfort, and a "services" side, the husband's right to
the domestic services of his wife.4 The Ohio courts, following the
majority of courts in this country, have adopted the view that both
husband and wife possess a right of consortium respecting sentimental
interests in the marital relationship.5 On the other hand, the courts
have been generally in accord in denying the wife a right to con-
sortium in her husband's domestic services, while granting the husband
such a right in the wife's services. This distinction is questionable both
from a logical and a historical standpoint.
1 Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
2 Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621, 32 Am. Rep. 397 (1878); Flandermeyer
v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912).
3 84 Onio LAws 132 (1887), OHIo GEN". CODE §§ 8002-I et seq. (Supp. 1951).
4 Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 Mric. L. REv. 1
(1923); Lippman. The Breakdown in Consortium, 30 COL. L. REv. 651 (1930).
5 Flandermeyer v. Cooper, supra note 2; Smith v. Lyon, 9 Ohio App. 141, 29
Ohio CA. 492 (1918).
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Before the Married Women's Acts, the common law gave only the
husband the right to his spouse's domestic services, based upon the
theory that the wife was her husband's servant. "The same principles
as were applied to the servant," says Holdsworth, "were applied to
the wife."0 With the passage of the Acts, the extension of equality to
the wife destroyed the servant concept as a basis for the right. Thus,
the courts were compelled to decide whether the husband's right to
his wife's services had become obsolete and should be abolished,
whether the wife was now to have an equal right to the services of the
husband, or whether the historical basis of the right in the husband
was to be ignored but his right preserved on some other theory. The
majority of jurisdictions, including Ohio, have adopted the latter
choice,7 while continuing to deny the wife a similar right to her
husband's services,8 although a few courts have given both equal
rights.9
Although it is generally stated that both the husband and wife
have a right of consortium, the court's have vigorously denied that
each is entitled to the same right, in the face of legislation purporting
to give equal rights to the parties to the marital relation. The only
possible explanation is that traditions have caused our courts to refuse
to recognize clearly worded statutes, a phenomenon which is hardly
a novelty in the law.
Having established that both parties to the marital relation
possess a right of consortium of one type or another, additional diffi-
culties arise as to when each may enforce such a right.
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS
The action for alienation of affections exists for the purpose of
protecting the right of consortium from intentional and malicious
invasion by an outsider.
The right of consortium which the courts are here protecting is
the "sentimental" type, i.e., the right to affection, companionship,
exclusive sexual intercourse and comfort. Thus both spouses have an
equal right, and the courts have been almost unanimous in allowing
both to bring an action for alienation of affections to protect the
right.1o
In order to recover for alienation of affections, some act of re-
6 8 HomsWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 429 (3rd. ed. 1933).
7 3 VERNIER, AMEJUcAN FAMILY I.AWS 86 (1935).
8 Shaveker v. Spinell, 125 Ohio St. 423, 181 N.E. 896 (1932); B. & 0. R. Co. v.
Glenn, 66 Ohio St. 395, 64 N.E. 438 (1902).
9 Eliason v. Draper, 25 Del. 1, 77 At. 572 (1910).
10 Heitmann v. Slee, 43 Ohio App. 302, 182 N.E. 659 (1932); Smith v. Lyon,
note 5 supra.
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straint" or malice12 must be shown. The act must have been in-
tentional; mere negligence resulting in alienation of affections will not,
as a general rule, give a right of action.13 When the invasion is shown
to have been intentional, and where affections were alienated as a
result, legal malice will be presumed from the knowledge of the in-
vader that the wayward spouse was married. The theory is that from
such knowledge - a necessary ingredient to the maintenance of the
action - a malicious intent may be implied.14
Alienation of affections must have resulted as a consequence of
the invader's act. Connivance by one spouse to bring about the third
person's invasion of the marital relation will preclude the conniving
party from maintaining an action. So also where the alienation resulted
from the neglect, lack of support' 5 or other improper conduct of the
plaintiff.'8 A mere *voluntary bestowal of affections on a third party
without any act inducing such bestowal will not give a cause of action.17
It is not essential to the maintenance of the action that the acts com-
plained of caused an actual separation' s or that adultery has been
committed, if alienation of affections can be shown. 19 Moreover, a
divorce procured by the spouse whose rights are alleged to have been
invaded, subsequent to the acts complained of, will not preclude that
person from bringing an action for the alienation.20
The question of the liability of parents and relatives of a spouse
for alienation of affections has often arisen, giving the courts a diffi-
cult problem in view of the close and confidential family relationship
of the parties involved. In general, the courts have applied the same
rules in this situation as in those where the invader was a stranger to
the family relationship. Legal malice, however, will rarely be im-
plied; the intention of the parents must clearly be shown tohave been
to invade the marital relation rather than to protect their child. Where
the parents have an honest and reasonable belief that it is necessary to
house and protect their daughter although in fact there is no such
necessity, they are not liable though the wife's affections for her
husband were alienated thereby.21
Although the action is commonly spoken of as being one to
11 Friend v. Thompson, W. 636 (Ohio 1834).
12 Westlake v. Westlake, note 2 supra.
13 Lillegren v. Burns Detective Agency, 125 Minn. 60, 160 N.V. 203 (1916).
14 Stefanidk v. Kuhns, 44 Ohio Op. 288, 96 N.E. (2d) 318 (1950); Booth v.
Krause, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 43, 65 N.E. (2d) 89 (1946).
15 Myers v. Raynolds, 3 Ohio N.P. 186, 5 Ohio Dec. 619 (1896).
16 Smith v. Lamneck, 9 Ohio L.R. 87 (1911).
17 Bloomer v. Cherry, 5 Ohio L.R. 534 (1907).
18 Binder v. Buller, 15 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 394, 27 Ohio Dec. 653 (1914).
19 Stefanidk v. Kuhns, note 14 supra; Booth v. Krause, note 14 supra.
20 Heitmann v. Slee, note 10 vupra.
21 Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791 (1884).
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protect the right of consortium, it is actually in the nature of com-
pensation for the loss of and a penalty for the invasion of the right of
consortium, the harm already having been done by the time the action
is brought. The Ohio courts have consistently refused beforehand
protection of the right, by the use of injunctive relief directed against
the invader, on the quite familiar theories that the injunction would
be difficult to enforce and that a right of consortium is not a "property"
right for the protection of which injunctive relief will issue.2 2
CRIMINAL CONVERSATION
The action for criminal conversation is said to be supplementary
to that for alienation of affections. Robert A. Brown, in his treatment
of the subject, states the distinction as follows: "The line between the
two actions is necessarily somewhat indistinct, but criminal conversa-
tion is the more definite action. Its defect, which the action for
alienation of affections corrects, is that a criminal conversation action
furnishes no adequate protection against many serious injuries to the
marital relationship which may not involve adultery, or if they do
involve that offense, also involve an injury to the consortium in other
respects. ' 23 Here again, both parties to the marital relation may bring
the action, the suit being allowed on the basis that, since the Married
Women's Acts, each spouse acquires the right to exclusive sexual in-
tercourse as a fundamental right of the marriage contract, and the
Acts made this right of the wife enforceable. 21 From the language of
the courts which, like Ohio, allow the action, it is dear that the right
of consortium involved in this action is of the "sentimental" type.
The requirements for the maintenance of this action are far less
stringent than those of the action for alienation of affections. Here,
the invader need have had no knowledge that his adulterous partner
was married, nor need he have been the moving party to the adulterous
relations. No alienation of affections need have resulted, as the action
is based wholly upon the act of adultery in violation of the other
spouse's exclusive right to sexual intercourse. 25
PERSONAL INJURY TO A SPousE
At common law, as we have already seen, no right of consortium
-was recognized in the wife, and she could not maintain an action for
22 Snedaker v. King, 111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924).
23 82 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 474 (1934).
24 Smith v. Lyon, note 5 supra.
25 Baltrunas v. Baubles, 23 Ohio App. 104, 154 N.E. 747 (1926).
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the loss of her husband's consortium where he had suffered personal
injuries caused either by negligent or wilful acts. Only the husband
could maintain such an action where his wife had been injured.2 6
After the Married Women's Acts, however, removing the common
law disabilities of the wife, we have seen that the wife was granted a
right of action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation to
protect her newly acquired "sentimental" type of consortium; while
the husband is entitled to protection of both the "sentimental" type
and the "services" type of consortium. It would seem that the wife
should at least be entitled to the protection of her admittedly inferior
right of consortium in all instances where that right has been injured,
but such has not been the case, and the wife here again suffers an in-
equality. The courts have consistently denied the wife a remedy where
the loss of consortium was due to a negligent injury to her husband.27
By the great weight of authority the wife is said to have no remedy for
such injuries to her husband, although the husband's right of action
for negligent injury to his wife was early recognized.2 8 This denial of
an equal right of action has been almost universally condemned by
legal writers.29 The incongruity of the situation is aptly presented
by Vernier who states, "The majority view which thus gives the
husband an action for a negligent injury to the wife, yet which denies
a similar action to her, is logically inconsistent in view of the equality
of married women."3 0
The various theories advanced by the courts in following such a
divergent path can be reduced to the following: (1) No statute gives
the wife a cause of action; (2) the injury is one for which the husband
can sue; (3) the injury is remote and inconsequential to the wife, and
(4) the injury to the wife is indirect and so not compensable. It is
submitted that each of these reasons for denying the wife an action is
an equally good reason for denying the husband such an action where
the wife has suffered negligent injury. But still a double standard
continues.
Hope for an early rectification of this inequality has been created
by a few scattered cases giving the wife an equal right with her husband
for loss of consortium due to a negligent injury.3 ' In Ohio, only one
case has been found giving the wife such an action, a decision of the
Cincinnati Superior Court in 1913.32 The Supreme Court has, how-
26 Westlake v. Westlake, note 2 supra.
27 Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co. note I supra.
28 B. & 0. R. Co. v. Glenn, note 8 supra.
29 PROSSER, TORTS 948 (1st. ed 1941).
'30 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 86 (1935).
31 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d. 811 (D.C. 1950).




ever, subsequently adhered to the majority view.33
Ohio has afforded the wife as well as the husband an action for loss
of consortium where the injury was caused by wilful act. Thus, the
wife may maintain an action against one who sells her husband
morphine against her protests34 or for unlawfully supplying her
husband with intoxicating liquors.
3 5
CONCLUSION
The unsatisfactory state of the law concerning the right of con-
sortium and its enforcement, brough about by illogical and unequal
rights in the parties to the marital relation, plus the evils of excessive
verdicts, coercive settlements and unfounded actions, have caused
many states to legislate away rights of action to protect the right of
consortium. Ohio has not yet done so, although bills providing for the
abolishment of so-called "heart balm" suits, including alienation of
affections and criminal conversation, have been before the General
Assembly.36 Yet with all the contradictions and illogical results
achieved by the courts in their seemingly groping attempt to give a
right of consortium to each of the spouses and to protect that right
from invasion by outsiders, it is still entirely possible that the right
and the remedies provided to protect it warrant all their troublesome
features by reason of their effect in discouraging the intentional break-
ing up of the marital relation by strangers to it. A device of any value
whatsoever in protecting the home and the family unit from all too
common disorganization should, today, be carefully examined before
it is discarded, whatever faults it may contain.
C. William Malone.
33 Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., note 1 supra.
34 Flandermeyer v. Cooper, note 2 supra.
35 Suligan v. Holmes, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 779 (1923).
36 House Bill No. 186, 93rd General Assembly of Ohio (1939); Senate Bill No.
192, House Bill Nos. 123, 170, 91st General Assembly of Ohio (1935).
